Zero Trust Engineering — Software-defined perimeter admission

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Networks and environments engineering reference for software-defined perimeter admission, including policy, logical interfaces, recovery and assurance.

Purpose: Software-defined perimeter admission. Domain: Networks and environments. Family: decision. Scenario trigger: Request access to concealed protected application. Input assurance: Authenticated principal, device compliance and resource locator. Evaluation: Validate preconnection proof and permitted service reachability. Governing policy: Pre-admission resource concealment and access policy. Resource-side obligation: Expose only a bounded authorized resource path. Protected concern: Protected software-defined resource edge. Logical interface: Principal proof requested resource preconnection decision and path binding. Evidence: Preconnection authorization route and session evidence. Failure: Network scanning, unknown peer or expired grant. Required recovery: Close resource exposure and revoke admission channel. Architectural invariant: Resources remain unreachable until preconnection policy permits access Adoption: replace reference roles with concrete owner-controlled services. Specify exact provider/consumer identities, schema fields and classifications, signal provenance and freshness, idempotency, authorization lifetime, timeout/retry limits, observation and tamper evidence. A denied or failed operation must not silently become a permitted one. Scope: original vendor-neutral, implementation-agnostic technical reference model. Illustrative logical components and behaviors are neither a deployed system nor evidence of regulatory compliance. Package identities remain stable within the package; cross-package semantic reconciliation requires separate explicit registry support.

Curated · other · unspecified · Published by Lattix · 28 elements · 34 relationships · validated on publish