Zero Trust Engineering — Secure software supply chain

securityv1

/01 Views

Capability definition and hierarchyarchimate
Operational activity sequencesecurity
Exception and recovery activity sequencesecurity
Conformant decision branchsecurity
Denied, conditional or degraded branchsecurity
Identity-scoped information exchangec4
Context and decision inputsecurity
Policy authority and evaluationsecurity
Decision distribution and resource mediationsecurity
Enforcement decision evidencesecurity
Policy ownershiparchimate
Security control and protected resourcesecurity
Control and failure risksecurity
Conformance obligationarchimate
Capability assurancearchimate
Resource trust boundarysecurity
Activity-to-capability realizationarchimate
Logical service capability realizationarchimate
Assurance evidence collectionsecurity
Independent finding verificationsecurity
Finding-to-response processsecurity

/02 About

Applications and workloads engineering reference for secure software supply chain, including policy, logical interfaces, recovery and assurance.

Purpose: Secure software supply chain. Domain: Applications and workloads. Family: assurance. Scenario trigger: Assess code-to-production artifact provenance. Input assurance: Source attestation, isolated build records and dependencies. Evaluation: Validate source integrity, policy scans and artifact provenance. Governing policy: Secure engineering pipeline and deployment trust policy. Resource-side obligation: Reject unverified build or publish signed immutable artifact. Protected concern: Enterprise software artifact repository. Logical interface: Source revision build context dependency inventory signature and SBOM. Evidence: Build provenance dependency report and release approval. Failure: Compromised build runner or untrusted dependency. Required recovery: Quarantine affected artifact and rebuild from trusted inputs. Architectural invariant: Deployment requires independent verification of software provenance Adoption: replace reference roles with concrete owner-controlled services. Specify exact provider/consumer identities, schema fields and classifications, signal provenance and freshness, idempotency, authorization lifetime, timeout/retry limits, observation and tamper evidence. A denied or failed operation must not silently become a permitted one. Scope: original vendor-neutral, implementation-agnostic technical reference model. Illustrative logical components and behaviors are neither a deployed system nor evidence of regulatory compliance. Package identities remain stable within the package; cross-package semantic reconciliation requires separate explicit registry support.

Curated · other · unspecified · Published by Lattix · 29 elements · 33 relationships · validated on publish

/03 Contents

Capability
Applications and workloads, Secure software supply chain
Role
Applications and workloads owner
Business Actor
Security telemetry or evidence producer
Activity
Assess code-to-production artifact provenance, Verify: Source attestation, isolated build records and dependencies, Assess: Validate source integrity, policy scans and artifact provenance, Execute: Reject unverified build or publish signed immutable artifact, Exception: Compromised build runner or untrusted dependency, Recover: Quarantine affected artifact and rebuild from trusted inputs, Verify and disposition finding
Application Component
Source attestation, isolated build records and dependencies, Validate source integrity, policy scans and artifact provenance, Reject unverified build or publish signed immutable artifact, Authenticated observation source, Detection and evidence correlation
Application
Enterprise software artifact repository
Policy
Secure engineering pipeline and deployment trust policy
API
Secure software supply chain logical interface
Message/Event Schema
Source revision build context dependency inventory signature and SBOM
Data Store
Build provenance dependency report and release approval, Versioned technical finding
Control
Secure software supply chain enforcement assurance
Risk
Compromised build runner or untrusted dependency risk
Requirement
Deployment requires independent verification of software provenance
Measure
Secure software supply chain assurance completeness
Trust Boundary
Secure software supply chain authority boundary
State
Control condition verified, Control gap or untrusted signal