Zero Trust Engineering — Secure software supply chain
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/02 About
Applications and workloads engineering reference for secure software supply chain, including policy, logical interfaces, recovery and assurance.
Purpose: Secure software supply chain. Domain: Applications and workloads. Family: assurance. Scenario trigger: Assess code-to-production artifact provenance. Input assurance: Source attestation, isolated build records and dependencies. Evaluation: Validate source integrity, policy scans and artifact provenance. Governing policy: Secure engineering pipeline and deployment trust policy. Resource-side obligation: Reject unverified build or publish signed immutable artifact. Protected concern: Enterprise software artifact repository. Logical interface: Source revision build context dependency inventory signature and SBOM. Evidence: Build provenance dependency report and release approval. Failure: Compromised build runner or untrusted dependency. Required recovery: Quarantine affected artifact and rebuild from trusted inputs. Architectural invariant: Deployment requires independent verification of software provenance Adoption: replace reference roles with concrete owner-controlled services. Specify exact provider/consumer identities, schema fields and classifications, signal provenance and freshness, idempotency, authorization lifetime, timeout/retry limits, observation and tamper evidence. A denied or failed operation must not silently become a permitted one. Scope: original vendor-neutral, implementation-agnostic technical reference model. Illustrative logical components and behaviors are neither a deployed system nor evidence of regulatory compliance. Package identities remain stable within the package; cross-package semantic reconciliation requires separate explicit registry support.
Curated · other · unspecified · Published by Lattix · 29 elements · 33 relationships · validated on publish
/03 Contents
- Capability
- Applications and workloads, Secure software supply chain
- Role
- Applications and workloads owner
- Business Actor
- Security telemetry or evidence producer
- Activity
- Assess code-to-production artifact provenance, Verify: Source attestation, isolated build records and dependencies, Assess: Validate source integrity, policy scans and artifact provenance, Execute: Reject unverified build or publish signed immutable artifact, Exception: Compromised build runner or untrusted dependency, Recover: Quarantine affected artifact and rebuild from trusted inputs, Verify and disposition finding
- Application Component
- Source attestation, isolated build records and dependencies, Validate source integrity, policy scans and artifact provenance, Reject unverified build or publish signed immutable artifact, Authenticated observation source, Detection and evidence correlation
- Application
- Enterprise software artifact repository
- Policy
- Secure engineering pipeline and deployment trust policy
- API
- Secure software supply chain logical interface
- Message/Event Schema
- Source revision build context dependency inventory signature and SBOM
- Data Store
- Build provenance dependency report and release approval, Versioned technical finding
- Control
- Secure software supply chain enforcement assurance
- Risk
- Compromised build runner or untrusted dependency risk
- Requirement
- Deployment requires independent verification of software provenance
- Measure
- Secure software supply chain assurance completeness
- Trust Boundary
- Secure software supply chain authority boundary
- State
- Control condition verified, Control gap or untrusted signal