Zero Trust Engineering — Incident-to-automated-remediation workflow

securityv1

/01 Views

Capability definition and hierarchyarchimate
Operational activity sequencesecurity
Exception and recovery activity sequencesecurity
Conformant decision branchsecurity
Denied, conditional or degraded branchsecurity
Identity-scoped information exchangec4
Context and decision inputsecurity
Policy authority and evaluationsecurity
Decision distribution and resource mediationsecurity
Enforcement decision evidencesecurity
Policy ownershiparchimate
Security control and protected resourcesecurity
Control and failure risksecurity
Conformance obligationarchimate
Capability assurancearchimate
Resource trust boundarysecurity
Activity-to-capability realizationarchimate
Logical service capability realizationarchimate
Baseline and proposed transitionsecurity
Pending transition assurancesecurity
Invalid transition suspensionsecurity

/02 About

Cross-domain integration engineering reference for incident-to-automated-remediation workflow, including policy, logical interfaces, recovery and assurance.

Purpose: Incident-to-automated-remediation workflow. Domain: Cross-domain integration. Family: lifecycle. Scenario trigger: Convert verified security incident into authorized response action. Input assurance: Incident severity, source evidence, target criticality and approvals. Evaluation: Evaluate remediation permission and safety preconditions. Governing policy: Incident response change control and automation blast-radius policy. Resource-side obligation: Execute bounded containment and verify postcondition. Protected concern: Enterprise security automation target service. Logical interface: Incident ID severity action owner target approval precondition and closure. Evidence: Incident case response approval action and verification evidence. Failure: Unverified incident triggers unsafe mass isolation. Required recovery: Stop automation and require independent incident escalation. Architectural invariant: Detection of compromise does not inherently authorize disruptive remediation Adoption: replace reference roles with concrete owner-controlled services. Specify exact provider/consumer identities, schema fields and classifications, signal provenance and freshness, idempotency, authorization lifetime, timeout/retry limits, observation and tamper evidence. A denied or failed operation must not silently become a permitted one. Scope: original vendor-neutral, implementation-agnostic technical reference model. Illustrative logical components and behaviors are neither a deployed system nor evidence of regulatory compliance. Package identities remain stable within the package; cross-package semantic reconciliation requires separate explicit registry support.

Curated · other · unspecified · Published by Lattix · 29 elements · 34 relationships · validated on publish

/03 Contents

Capability
Cross-domain integration, Incident-to-automated-remediation workflow
Role
Cross-domain integration owner
Business Actor
Lifecycle or resource administrator
Activity
Convert verified security incident into authorized response action, Verify: Incident severity, source evidence, target criticality and approvals, Assess: Evaluate remediation permission and safety preconditions, Execute: Execute bounded containment and verify postcondition, Exception: Unverified incident triggers unsafe mass isolation, Recover: Stop automation and require independent incident escalation
Application Component
Incident severity, source evidence, target criticality and approvals, Evaluate remediation permission and safety preconditions, Execute bounded containment and verify postcondition
Application
Enterprise security automation target service
Policy
Incident response change control and automation blast-radius policy
API
Incident-to-automated-remediation workflow logical interface
Message/Event Schema
Incident ID severity action owner target approval precondition and closure
Data Store
Incident case response approval action and verification evidence
Control
Incident-to-automated-remediation workflow enforcement assurance
Risk
Unverified incident triggers unsafe mass isolation risk
Requirement
Detection of compromise does not inherently authorize disruptive remediation
Measure
Incident-to-automated-remediation workflow assurance completeness
Trust Boundary
Incident-to-automated-remediation workflow authority boundary
State
Transition verified, Lifecycle transition rejected, Baseline state established, Change pending independent validation, Transition suspended, Lifecycle transition closed