Zero Trust Engineering — Identity-to-application authorization integration

securityv1

/01 Views

Capability definition and hierarchyarchimate
Operational activity sequencesecurity
Exception and recovery activity sequencesecurity
Conformant decision branchsecurity
Denied, conditional or degraded branchsecurity
Identity-scoped information exchangec4
Context and decision inputsecurity
Policy authority and evaluationsecurity
Decision distribution and resource mediationsecurity
Enforcement decision evidencesecurity
Policy ownershiparchimate
Security control and protected resourcesecurity
Control and failure risksecurity
Conformance obligationarchimate
Capability assurancearchimate
Resource trust boundarysecurity
Activity-to-capability realizationarchimate
Logical service capability realizationarchimate
Step-up outcomesecurity
Challenge collectionsecurity
Fresh policy evaluationsecurity
Active-session revocationsecurity

/02 About

Cross-domain integration engineering reference for identity-to-application authorization integration, including policy, logical interfaces, recovery and assurance.

Purpose: Identity-to-application authorization integration. Domain: Cross-domain integration. Family: decision. Scenario trigger: Authorize application request by principal and service claims. Input assurance: User identity, workload identity, token audience and operation. Evaluation: Evaluate delegated application scope and resource-specific rules. Governing policy: Application identity-to-permission propagation policy. Resource-side obligation: Enforce fine-grained API or session grant at protected operation. Protected concern: Enterprise business application API. Logical interface: Subject service identity audience scope operation decision and expiry. Evidence: Identity propagation chain app authorization and response evidence. Failure: Forged delegated actor or overbroad application token. Required recovery: Deny operation and request trusted end-user and workload context. Architectural invariant: Service authentication cannot turn broad delegated claims into application privilege Adoption: replace reference roles with concrete owner-controlled services. Specify exact provider/consumer identities, schema fields and classifications, signal provenance and freshness, idempotency, authorization lifetime, timeout/retry limits, observation and tamper evidence. A denied or failed operation must not silently become a permitted one. Scope: original vendor-neutral, implementation-agnostic technical reference model. Illustrative logical components and behaviors are neither a deployed system nor evidence of regulatory compliance. Package identities remain stable within the package; cross-package semantic reconciliation requires separate explicit registry support.

Curated · other · unspecified · Published by Lattix · 28 elements · 34 relationships · validated on publish

/03 Contents

Capability
Cross-domain integration, Identity-to-application authorization integration
Role
Cross-domain integration owner
Business Actor
Access-requesting principal
Activity
Authorize application request by principal and service claims, Verify: User identity, workload identity, token audience and operation, Assess: Evaluate delegated application scope and resource-specific rules, Execute: Enforce fine-grained API or session grant at protected operation, Exception: Forged delegated actor or overbroad application token, Recover: Deny operation and request trusted end-user and workload context, Collect additional authorization evidence
Application Component
User identity, workload identity, token audience and operation, Evaluate delegated application scope and resource-specific rules, Enforce fine-grained API or session grant at protected operation
Application
Enterprise business application API
Policy
Application identity-to-permission propagation policy
API
Identity-to-application authorization integration logical interface
Message/Event Schema
Subject service identity audience scope operation decision and expiry
Data Store
Identity propagation chain app authorization and response evidence
Control
Identity-to-application authorization integration enforcement assurance
Risk
Forged delegated actor or overbroad application token risk
Requirement
Service authentication cannot turn broad delegated claims into application privilege
Measure
Identity-to-application authorization integration assurance completeness
Trust Boundary
Identity-to-application authorization integration authority boundary
State
Conditionally authorized, Denied or additional proof required, Additional assurance required, Active authorization revoked