Zero Trust Engineering — Enterprise trust-boundary and threat propagation model

securityv1

/01 Views

Capability definition and hierarchyarchimate
Operational activity sequencesecurity
Exception and recovery activity sequencesecurity
Conformant decision branchsecurity
Denied, conditional or degraded branchsecurity
Identity-scoped information exchangec4
Context and decision inputsecurity
Policy authority and evaluationsecurity
Decision distribution and resource mediationsecurity
Enforcement decision evidencesecurity
Policy ownershiparchimate
Security control and protected resourcesecurity
Control and failure risksecurity
Conformance obligationarchimate
Capability assurancearchimate
Resource trust boundarysecurity
Activity-to-capability realizationarchimate
Logical service capability realizationarchimate
Assurance evidence collectionsecurity
Independent finding verificationsecurity
Finding-to-response processsecurity

/02 About

Cross-domain integration engineering reference for enterprise trust-boundary and threat propagation model, including policy, logical interfaces, recovery and assurance.

Purpose: Enterprise trust-boundary and threat propagation model. Domain: Cross-domain integration. Family: assurance. Scenario trigger: Analyze adversarial movement across enterprise trust boundaries. Input assurance: Trust domains, assets, entry points and attack preconditions. Evaluation: Evaluate feasible threat propagation and available enforcement barriers. Governing policy: Enterprise threat boundary, risk classification and control policy. Resource-side obligation: Enforce verified boundaries and prioritize vulnerable pathways. Protected concern: Enterprise distributed resource trust graph. Logical interface: Threat source boundary target identity precondition and control outcome. Evidence: Attack path preconditions control gaps and mitigation evidence. Failure: Unmodeled credential reuse crosses multiple trust domains. Required recovery: Contain affected identities and close uncontrolled boundary. Architectural invariant: Every trust crossing requires independently justified authorization Adoption: replace reference roles with concrete owner-controlled services. Specify exact provider/consumer identities, schema fields and classifications, signal provenance and freshness, idempotency, authorization lifetime, timeout/retry limits, observation and tamper evidence. A denied or failed operation must not silently become a permitted one. Scope: original vendor-neutral, implementation-agnostic technical reference model. Illustrative logical components and behaviors are neither a deployed system nor evidence of regulatory compliance. Package identities remain stable within the package; cross-package semantic reconciliation requires separate explicit registry support.

Curated · other · unspecified · Published by Lattix · 29 elements · 33 relationships · validated on publish

/03 Contents

Capability
Cross-domain integration, Enterprise trust-boundary and threat propagation model
Role
Cross-domain integration owner
Business Actor
Security telemetry or evidence producer
Activity
Analyze adversarial movement across enterprise trust boundaries, Verify: Trust domains, assets, entry points and attack preconditions, Assess: Evaluate feasible threat propagation and available enforcement barriers, Execute: Enforce verified boundaries and prioritize vulnerable pathways, Exception: Unmodeled credential reuse crosses multiple trust domains, Recover: Contain affected identities and close uncontrolled boundary, Verify and disposition finding
Application Component
Trust domains, assets, entry points and attack preconditions, Evaluate feasible threat propagation and available enforcement barriers, Enforce verified boundaries and prioritize vulnerable pathways, Authenticated observation source, Detection and evidence correlation
Application
Enterprise distributed resource trust graph
Policy
Enterprise threat boundary, risk classification and control policy
API
Enterprise trust-boundary and threat propagation model logical interface
Message/Event Schema
Threat source boundary target identity precondition and control outcome
Data Store
Attack path preconditions control gaps and mitigation evidence, Versioned technical finding
Control
Enterprise trust-boundary and threat propagation model enforcement assurance
Risk
Unmodeled credential reuse crosses multiple trust domains risk
Requirement
Every trust crossing requires independently justified authorization
Measure
Enterprise trust-boundary and threat propagation model assurance completeness
Trust Boundary
Enterprise trust-boundary and threat propagation model authority boundary
State
Control condition verified, Control gap or untrusted signal