Zero Trust Engineering — Service-to-service authentication

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Applications and workloads engineering reference for service-to-service authentication, including policy, logical interfaces, recovery and assurance.

Purpose: Service-to-service authentication. Domain: Applications and workloads. Family: exchange. Scenario trigger: Begin internal authenticated service call. Input assurance: Both workload credentials, audience and channel properties. Evaluation: Verify mutual service identity and connection integrity. Governing policy: Service authenticator, token audience and peer-binding policy. Resource-side obligation: Establish mutually trusted service channel. Protected concern: Internal service invocation path. Logical interface: Service identity nonce audience certificate or token and channel binding. Evidence: Peer assertion verification and channel establishment evidence. Failure: Credential replay, expired certificate or wrong audience. Required recovery: Reject connection and renegotiate with fresh credentials. Architectural invariant: Trusted network segments do not eliminate mutual workload authentication Adoption: replace reference roles with concrete owner-controlled services. Specify exact provider/consumer identities, schema fields and classifications, signal provenance and freshness, idempotency, authorization lifetime, timeout/retry limits, observation and tamper evidence. A denied or failed operation must not silently become a permitted one. Scope: original vendor-neutral, implementation-agnostic technical reference model. Illustrative logical components and behaviors are neither a deployed system nor evidence of regulatory compliance. Package identities remain stable within the package; cross-package semantic reconciliation requires separate explicit registry support.

Curated · other · unspecified · Published by Lattix · 29 elements · 34 relationships · validated on publish