Zero Trust Engineering — Service mesh and sidecar-independent logical architecture

securityv1

/01 Views

Capability definition and hierarchyarchimate
Operational activity sequencesecurity
Exception and recovery activity sequencesecurity
Conformant decision branchsecurity
Denied, conditional or degraded branchsecurity
Identity-scoped information exchangec4
Context and decision inputsecurity
Policy authority and evaluationsecurity
Decision distribution and resource mediationsecurity
Enforcement decision evidencesecurity
Policy ownershiparchimate
Security control and protected resourcesecurity
Control and failure risksecurity
Conformance obligationarchimate
Capability assurancearchimate
Resource trust boundarysecurity
Activity-to-capability realizationarchimate
Logical service capability realizationarchimate
Source contractsecurity
Consumer, receipt and acknowledgementsecurity
Idempotent exchange evidencesecurity

/02 About

Applications and workloads engineering reference for service mesh and sidecar-independent logical architecture, including policy, logical interfaces, recovery and assurance.

Purpose: Service mesh and sidecar-independent logical architecture. Domain: Applications and workloads. Family: exchange. Scenario trigger: Invoke authenticated service across managed runtime boundary. Input assurance: Workload identity, policy propagation and routing metadata. Evaluation: Validate logical proxy separation and service authorization. Governing policy: Service-to-service trust and traffic-governance policy. Resource-side obligation: Mediate secure workload traffic regardless of proxy placement. Protected concern: Distributed application service runtime. Logical interface: Service invocation routing context mTLS identity policy verdict and trace. Evidence: Service identity policy and connection lifecycle telemetry. Failure: Interception bypass or inconsistent mesh policy. Required recovery: Deny unmatched traffic and restore consistent admission control. Architectural invariant: The logical enforcement pattern must not depend on a particular proxy form Adoption: replace reference roles with concrete owner-controlled services. Specify exact provider/consumer identities, schema fields and classifications, signal provenance and freshness, idempotency, authorization lifetime, timeout/retry limits, observation and tamper evidence. A denied or failed operation must not silently become a permitted one. Scope: original vendor-neutral, implementation-agnostic technical reference model. Illustrative logical components and behaviors are neither a deployed system nor evidence of regulatory compliance. Package identities remain stable within the package; cross-package semantic reconciliation requires separate explicit registry support.

Curated · other · unspecified · Published by Lattix · 29 elements · 34 relationships · validated on publish

/03 Contents

Capability
Applications and workloads, Service mesh and sidecar-independent logical architecture
Role
Applications and workloads owner
Business Actor
Interoperating security service
Activity
Invoke authenticated service across managed runtime boundary, Verify: Workload identity, policy propagation and routing metadata, Assess: Validate logical proxy separation and service authorization, Execute: Mediate secure workload traffic regardless of proxy placement, Exception: Interception bypass or inconsistent mesh policy, Recover: Deny unmatched traffic and restore consistent admission control
Application Component
Workload identity, policy propagation and routing metadata, Validate logical proxy separation and service authorization, Mediate secure workload traffic regardless of proxy placement, Authenticated exchange producer, Authorized exchange consumer, Receipt and replay reconciliation
Application
Distributed application service runtime
Policy
Service-to-service trust and traffic-governance policy
API
Service mesh and sidecar-independent logical architecture logical interface
Message/Event Schema
Service invocation routing context mTLS identity policy verdict and trace, Exchange acknowledgement and receipt
Data Store
Service identity policy and connection lifecycle telemetry
Control
Service mesh and sidecar-independent logical architecture enforcement assurance
Risk
Interception bypass or inconsistent mesh policy risk
Requirement
The logical enforcement pattern must not depend on a particular proxy form
Measure
Service mesh and sidecar-independent logical architecture assurance completeness
Trust Boundary
Service mesh and sidecar-independent logical architecture authority boundary
State
Authorized information transfer, Exchange blocked or deferred