Zero Trust Engineering — Device trust-state machine

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Devices and endpoints engineering reference for device trust-state machine, including policy, logical interfaces, recovery and assurance.

Purpose: Device trust-state machine. Domain: Devices and endpoints. Family: lifecycle. Scenario trigger: Process device enrollment or posture transition. Input assurance: Current trust state, signed event and remediation status. Evaluation: Validate legal state transitions and state provenance. Governing policy: Trusted, degraded, isolated and retired state policy. Resource-side obligation: Transition device admission state with reproducible evidence. Protected concern: Managed device trust register. Logical interface: Device state prior state event reason policy version and timestamp. Evidence: Transition event precondition actor and final state. Failure: Invalid state transition or conflicting status update. Required recovery: Reject inconsistent event and reconcile authoritative device state. Architectural invariant: Device trust states and transitions must be explicit, auditable and reversible when permitted Adoption: replace reference roles with concrete owner-controlled services. Specify exact provider/consumer identities, schema fields and classifications, signal provenance and freshness, idempotency, authorization lifetime, timeout/retry limits, observation and tamper evidence. A denied or failed operation must not silently become a permitted one. Scope: original vendor-neutral, implementation-agnostic technical reference model. Illustrative logical components and behaviors are neither a deployed system nor evidence of regulatory compliance. Package identities remain stable within the package; cross-package semantic reconciliation requires separate explicit registry support.

Curated · other · unspecified · Published by Lattix · 29 elements · 34 relationships · validated on publish