Zero Trust Engineering — Device attestation and evidence verification

/02 About

Devices and endpoints engineering reference for device attestation and evidence verification, including policy, logical interfaces, recovery and assurance.

Purpose: Device attestation and evidence verification. Domain: Devices and endpoints. Family: decision. Scenario trigger: Request remotely verifiable device health claim. Input assurance: Attestation nonce, signing authority and measured claims. Evaluation: Validate nonce binding, signatures and freshness. Governing policy: Device attestation root and verifier acceptance policy. Resource-side obligation: Release device assurance assertion to authorization flow. Protected concern: Protected service admission. Logical interface: Device proof nonce measurement issuer freshness and evidence result. Evidence: Attestation request proof and verifier rationale. Failure: Replayed proof or unattested security boundary. Required recovery: Reject device assertion and require fresh attestation. Architectural invariant: Attestation validity does not imply unrestricted resource authorization Adoption: replace reference roles with concrete owner-controlled services. Specify exact provider/consumer identities, schema fields and classifications, signal provenance and freshness, idempotency, authorization lifetime, timeout/retry limits, observation and tamper evidence. A denied or failed operation must not silently become a permitted one. Scope: original vendor-neutral, implementation-agnostic technical reference model. Illustrative logical components and behaviors are neither a deployed system nor evidence of regulatory compliance. Package identities remain stable within the package; cross-package semantic reconciliation requires separate explicit registry support.

Curated · other · unspecified · Published by Lattix · 28 elements · 34 relationships · validated on publish