Zero Trust Engineering — Control objective to architecture mapping

archimatev1

/01 Views

Capability definition and hierarchyarchimate
Operational activity sequencearchimate
Exception and recovery activity sequencearchimate
Conformant decision brancharchimate
Denied, conditional or degraded brancharchimate
Identity-scoped information exchangec4
Context and decision inputarchimate
Policy authority and evaluationsecurity
Decision distribution and resource mediationsecurity
Enforcement decision evidencesecurity
Policy ownershiparchimate
Security control and protected resourcesecurity
Control and failure risksecurity
Conformance obligationarchimate
Capability assurancearchimate
Resource trust boundarysecurity
Activity-to-capability realizationarchimate
Logical service capability realizationarchimate
Independent authorization and accountabilityarchimate
Exception expirationarchimate
Governed risk authorityarchimate

/02 About

Governance and assurance engineering reference for control objective to architecture mapping, including policy, logical interfaces, recovery and assurance.

Purpose: Control objective to architecture mapping. Domain: Governance and assurance. Family: governance. Scenario trigger: Associate control objective with implementable logical service. Input assurance: Control requirement, protected asset and technical enforcement evidence. Evaluation: Verify control coverage and trace to intended decision point. Governing policy: Control-to-capability mapping and effectiveness policy. Resource-side obligation: Publish reviewed control traceability and missing-coverage findings. Protected concern: Enterprise security control register. Logical interface: Control objective capability service implementation evidence and gap. Evidence: Control objective mapped implementation verification and ownership. Failure: Declared control lacks real enforcement or measurable evidence. Required recovery: Classify control as unverified and require compensating design. Architectural invariant: Mapping a control to a diagram is not proof of operating control Adoption: replace reference roles with concrete owner-controlled services. Specify exact provider/consumer identities, schema fields and classifications, signal provenance and freshness, idempotency, authorization lifetime, timeout/retry limits, observation and tamper evidence. A denied or failed operation must not silently become a permitted one. Scope: original vendor-neutral, implementation-agnostic technical reference model. Illustrative logical components and behaviors are neither a deployed system nor evidence of regulatory compliance. Package identities remain stable within the package; cross-package semantic reconciliation requires separate explicit registry support.

Curated · other · unspecified · Published by Lattix · 29 elements · 34 relationships · validated on publish

/03 Contents

Capability
Governance and assurance, Control objective to architecture mapping
Role
Governance and assurance owner, Independent risk or control reviewer
Business Actor
Accountable enterprise stakeholder
Activity
Associate control objective with implementable logical service, Verify: Control requirement, protected asset and technical enforcement evidence, Assess: Verify control coverage and trace to intended decision point, Execute: Publish reviewed control traceability and missing-coverage findings, Exception: Declared control lacks real enforcement or measurable evidence, Recover: Classify control as unverified and require compensating design, Independently approve or reject proposal, Expire and reconcile exceptions
Application Component
Control requirement, protected asset and technical enforcement evidence, Verify control coverage and trace to intended decision point, Publish reviewed control traceability and missing-coverage findings
Application
Enterprise security control register
Policy
Control-to-capability mapping and effectiveness policy
API
Control objective to architecture mapping logical interface
Message/Event Schema
Control objective capability service implementation evidence and gap
Data Store
Control objective mapped implementation verification and ownership
Control
Control objective to architecture mapping enforcement assurance
Risk
Declared control lacks real enforcement or measurable evidence risk
Requirement
Mapping a control to a diagram is not proof of operating control
Measure
Control objective to architecture mapping assurance completeness
Trust Boundary
Control objective to architecture mapping authority boundary
State
Governance approval recorded, Exception or rejection recorded
Business Object
Governance proposal and rationale