Zero Trust Engineering — Automation authorization and blast-radius containment

securityv1

/01 Views

Capability definition and hierarchyarchimate
Operational activity sequencesecurity
Exception and recovery activity sequencesecurity
Conformant decision branchsecurity
Denied, conditional or degraded branchsecurity
Identity-scoped information exchangec4
Context and decision inputsecurity
Policy authority and evaluationsecurity
Decision distribution and resource mediationsecurity
Enforcement decision evidencesecurity
Policy ownershiparchimate
Security control and protected resourcesecurity
Control and failure risksecurity
Conformance obligationarchimate
Capability assurancearchimate
Resource trust boundarysecurity
Activity-to-capability realizationarchimate
Logical service capability realizationarchimate
Step-up outcomesecurity
Challenge collectionsecurity
Fresh policy evaluationsecurity
Active-session revocationsecurity

/02 About

Automation and orchestration engineering reference for automation authorization and blast-radius containment, including policy, logical interfaces, recovery and assurance.

Purpose: Automation authorization and blast-radius containment. Domain: Automation and orchestration. Family: decision. Scenario trigger: Authorize privileged security automation command. Input assurance: Agent identity, intended resources and approved action scope. Evaluation: Calculate side-effect risk, allowed target set and permissions. Governing policy: Automation least privilege, rate and execution approval policy. Resource-side obligation: Execute sandboxed scoped action with independent verification. Protected concern: Security orchestration execution runtime. Logical interface: Automation principal tool name target set scope expiration and kill switch. Evidence: Automation command, authorization, effect and rollback evidence. Failure: Tool abuse, prompt injection or runaway response cascade. Required recovery: Suspend delegated authority and terminate affected jobs. Architectural invariant: Security automation must never derive authority from untrusted content Adoption: replace reference roles with concrete owner-controlled services. Specify exact provider/consumer identities, schema fields and classifications, signal provenance and freshness, idempotency, authorization lifetime, timeout/retry limits, observation and tamper evidence. A denied or failed operation must not silently become a permitted one. Scope: original vendor-neutral, implementation-agnostic technical reference model. Illustrative logical components and behaviors are neither a deployed system nor evidence of regulatory compliance. Package identities remain stable within the package; cross-package semantic reconciliation requires separate explicit registry support.

Curated · other · unspecified · Published by Lattix · 28 elements · 34 relationships · validated on publish

/03 Contents

Capability
Automation and orchestration, Automation authorization and blast-radius containment
Role
Automation and orchestration owner
Business Actor
Access-requesting principal
Activity
Authorize privileged security automation command, Verify: Agent identity, intended resources and approved action scope, Assess: Calculate side-effect risk, allowed target set and permissions, Execute: Execute sandboxed scoped action with independent verification, Exception: Tool abuse, prompt injection or runaway response cascade, Recover: Suspend delegated authority and terminate affected jobs, Collect additional authorization evidence
Application Component
Agent identity, intended resources and approved action scope, Calculate side-effect risk, allowed target set and permissions, Execute sandboxed scoped action with independent verification
Application
Security orchestration execution runtime
Policy
Automation least privilege, rate and execution approval policy
API
Automation authorization and blast-radius containment logical interface
Message/Event Schema
Automation principal tool name target set scope expiration and kill switch
Data Store
Automation command, authorization, effect and rollback evidence
Control
Automation authorization and blast-radius containment enforcement assurance
Risk
Tool abuse, prompt injection or runaway response cascade risk
Requirement
Security automation must never derive authority from untrusted content
Measure
Automation authorization and blast-radius containment assurance completeness
Trust Boundary
Automation authorization and blast-radius containment authority boundary
State
Conditionally authorized, Denied or additional proof required, Additional assurance required, Active authorization revoked